Abstract: Session initiation protocol (SIP) is the most popular signalling protocol used in order to establish, maintain and terminate a multimedia sessions between different participants. Nowadays, the security of SIP is becoming more and more important. Authentication is the most important security service required for SIP. To provide secure communication, many SIP authentication schemes have been proposed. Very recently, Farash et al. proposed a new SIP authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. They proved that their scheme is secured against different attacks. However, in this paper we show that Farash et al.'s protocol suffers from Denning-Sacco attacks and denial of service attacks. Moreover, we propose our solution to solve the problem. The security analysis shows that our proposed solution is more secure and can resist to various attacks.
Introduction
Session initiation protocol (SIP) (Handley, 1999) , Rosenberg et al. (2002) is a text-based application layer signalling protocol built on the basis of protocols, such as HTTP or SMTP. The exchanges are in the form of dialogues (peer-to-peer relationships between agents) that include transactions (request/response). SIP is standardised by the internet engineering task force (IETF), and it is used as a signalling protocol to control communications on the internet for establishing, maintaining and terminating an interactive multimedia sessions between different participants. SIP is not limited to telephony over IP, voice over IP and instant messaging, but it can also be used by various applications such as online game.
HTTP digest authentication of Franks et al. (1999) is the first authentication protocol proposed for SIP. As the authentication is the most security service required for SIP, and the original SIP authentication protocol was found vulnerable to deferent attacks, different protocols have been proposed to reinforce the security of SIP.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives general information on the architecture and the original SIP authentication protocol. In Section 3, we listed the different related works. In Section 4, we briefly reviewed the Farash et al.'s SIP authentication protocol. Then, in Section 5, we analysed the security of Farash et al.'s protocol. Section 6 presents our proposed protocol. The performance security of our proposed protocol is given in Sections 7 and 8. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of SIP, which is composed of proxy server, redirect server, registrar server, location server and user agents. The role of each component is described as follows.
Background on SIP protocol

SIP architecture
• User agent (UA): it can be a SoftPhone (software) or HardPhone (IP phone). It is able to generate, send and receive SIP requests. It can act as user agent client or user agent server.
• Registrar server: handles the registration of SIP terminals. This is a server that accepts SIP REGISTER requests.
• Proxy server: it is a server which is connected to fixed or mobile terminals (UA). It plays the role of a server and client.
• Redirect server: it is a server that accepts SIP requests, translates the SIP address of a destination to IP address and returns them to the client.
• Location server: it provides the proxy server, redirect server and register server, it allows for them to look up or register the location of the user agent. 
Authentication HTTP digest
The authentication of SIP is the most security service recommended by the IETF. The messages exchanged between the server and the user during authentication procedure are illustrated in Figure 2 and they are described as follows:
• Step 1. Client → Server : REQUEST The client sends a REQUEST to the server.
• Step 2. Server → Client : CHALLENGE (nonce, realm) The server generates nonce. Then it sends back CHALLENGE that includes a nonce and realm to the client.
• Step 3. Client → Server: RESPONSE (nonce, realm, username, response) After receiving CHALLENGE from the server the client computes the response by using received nonce, username, secret password, and realm. response = F(nonce, username, password, realm). F(.) is a one-way hash function. Next, the client sends back to the server the message RESPONSE which contains the computed response, username, nonce and realm.
• Step 4. According to username the server extracts the client.'s password. Then the server verifies wither nonce is correct or not. If it is correct, the server computes F(nonce, username, password, realm) and uses it to compare it with the received response. If they match, the server authenticates the identity of the client. 
Elliptic curve cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was introduced by Koblitz (1987) . ECC proposed as an alternative to established public-key systems, such as Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). ECC have lately received a lot of attention in information security. The main reason for the attractiveness of ECC is the fact that there is no sub-exponential algorithm known to solve the discrete logarithm problem on a properly chosen elliptic curve. This means that ECC uses the keys of small size but offer the same levels of security offered by the Diffie-Hellman key large sizes. Some benefits of having smaller key sizes include faster computations, and reductions in processing power, storage space and bandwidth. This makes ECC ideal for constrained environments, such as cellular phones and smart cards. The ECC equation is defined as the form in (1).
where a, b, c and e are real numbers. In cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form in (2) over a prim finite field F p , where a, b ∈ F p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0(mod p). Given an integer k ∈ F * p and a point P ∈ E p (a, b), the scalar multiplication kP over E p (a, b) can be computed as in (3).
Definition 1: Given two points P and Q over E p (a, b), the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is to find an integer k ∈ F * p such as Q = kP .
Definition 2: Given three points P, sP and kP over E p (a, b) for s, k ∈ F * p , the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to find the point skP over E p (a, b).
Definition 3: Given two points P and Q = sP + kP over E p (a, b) for s, k ∈ F * p , the elliptic curve factorisation problem is to find two points sP and kP over E p (a, b). Yang et al. (2005) demonstrated that the original SIP authentication protocol is vulnerable to password guessing attack and server spoofing attack. Then, they proposed a new SIP authentication protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Diffie and Hellman, 1976 Durlanik and Sogukpinar (2005) proposed another SIP authentication protocol using the ECC Diffie-Hellman (Koblitz, 1987) . The proposed protocol can reduce the computation time if it is compared with the related protocols. In addition, it allows the use of smaller key sizes but offer the same security offered by the Diffie-Hellman key large sizes. However, Yoon and Yoo (2009b) and Yoon et al. (2010) introduced that the protocol of Durlanik and Sogukpinar cannot resist to the stolen verifier attack and Denning-Sacco attack. Wu et al. (2009) proposed a new SIP authentication and key exchange protocol based on ECC. Wu et al. demonstrated that their protocol provides several security services such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, access control and perfect forward secrecy. However, Wu et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, DenningSacco attack and stolen verifier attack as demonstrated in Yoon and Yoo (2008) . In the same year, Tsai (2009) proposed an authentication protocol for SIP based on random nonce. Tsai's protocol can reduce the computation time cost when it is compared with the existing protocols. However, it is demonstrated vulnerable to different attack in Yoon and Yoo (2009a) and Liu and Koenig (2011) . Yoon and Yoo (2009a) proposed a new secure authentication protocol based on ECC discrete logarithm problem. They demonstrated that their protocol is the faster when it is compared with previous proposed protocols. Moreover, it is secure against man-in-the-middle attack, offline password guessing attack, replay attack, modification attack, Denning-Sacco attack and stolen verifier attack. However, Liu and Koenig (2011) demonstrated that Yoon et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and partition attack. Yoon et al. (2010) based on weakness of Durlanik and Sogukpinar protocol and on the problems of Wu et al.'s protocol to propose another authentication protocol. However, this protocol is proved vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack in Xie (2012) . Arshad and Ikram (2013) demonstrated that Tsai et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack, and it does not provide neither key known secrecy nor perfect forward secrecy. As result, Arshad and Ikram proposed an authentication protocol for SIP based on ECC. They showed that their protocol is secure against offline password guessing attack, modification attack, stolen verifier attack, server spoofing attack and man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, it provides known key secrecy, session key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. After a comparison of their protocol with Yang et al.'s protocol and Tsai's protocol, Arshad and Ikram concluded that their protocol is the more efficient.
Related works
Xie (2012) showed that the protocol of Yoon and Yoo is insecure against stolen verifier attack and offline password guessing attack. Based on these attacks, Xie introduced a new SIP authentication protocol. Then, he demonstrated that his protocol is more secure, and it is faster when it is compared with existing protocols. However, Xie's protocol is shown vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and impersonation attack in Farash and Attari (2013) . Tang and Liu (2013) noted that the protocol introduced by Arshad and Ikram is not secure against offline password guessing attack. In order to deal with this problem, Tang and Liu (2013) Farash and Attari (2013) noted that the protocol proposed by Xie is defenceless to offline password guessing attack and to impersonation attack. Therefore, Farash and Attari (2013) proposed another authentication protocol for SIP and demonstrated that their protocol can resist to offline password guessing attack, stolen verifier attack, DenningSacco attack, man-in-the-middle attack and replay attack. Zhang et al. (2013) introduced for the first time smart-card-based protocol and key exchange for SIP. Then, they demonstrated that their protocol is secure against different attacks. However, Tu et al. (2014) , Wu et al. (2009) , Irshad et al. (2013) , Zhang et al. (2014) and Jiang et al. (2015) demonstrated that Zhang et al.'s scheme is insecure against impersonation attack. In order to solve the problem, Tu et al. (2014) proposed a new SIP authentication protocol. Then, they proved that their scheme is secure against various attacks.
Nik and Shahrab (2014) proposed a mutual SIP authentication scheme based on ECC and demonstrated that their proposed scheme can resist to modification attack, DenningSacco attack, registration attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and stolen verifier attack. Zhu et al. (2015 ) showed that Tu et al.'s protocol is insecure against server spoofing attack and user impersonation attack. As result, Zhu et al. proposed an enhanced protocol. In the same year, Chaudhry et al. (2015) noted that Farash et al.'s SIP authentication protocol is vulnerable to server forgery attack as well as strong replay and denial of services (DoS) attack. Lu et al. (2015) proposed an improved and robust biometrics-based three factor authentication scheme for multiserver environments. Later, Kumari et al. (2017) proposed an improved smart card-based authentication scheme for session initiation protocol. Then, Chaudhry (2016) proposed a secure biometric-based multiserver authentication scheme for social multimedia networks. Very recently, Lin et al. (2017) and Azrour et al. (2017) proposed a new SIP authentication protocols. In order to have more detailed information about related protocol, we can refer to Azrour et al. (2016) .
Review of Farash et al.'s protocol
In this section, we briefly review the Farash et al.'s SIP authentication protocol. Farash et al.'s scheme consists of four phases the system setup phase, registration phase, the authentication phase and the password change phase. The notations used in this paper are described as follows.
• U : a user
• Username: the identity of the user U
• Realm : is used to prompt the username and password • E(GF q ) : an elliptic curve group defined over GF q
• P : a generator of E(GF q ) with order q
•
: the string concatenation operation
• ⊕ : The exclusive-or operation
System setup phase
In the system setup phase, S generates the following system parameters: an elliptic curve E over a finite field GF q , an additive group of points on the elliptic curve E(GF q ), the generating point P on E(GF q ) of order q and a secure hash function h(.). S also selects an integer K s ∈ (1, q) as the long-live secret key, and computes Qs = K s P as the corresponding public key. Finally, S publishes the parameters (E(GF q ), P, q, h(.), Q s .
Registration phase
In this phase the user communicates with the server through a secure channel as following.
• Reg1: The user U freely chooses his/her username and password P W . Then, U sends them to the server through a secure channel.
• Reg2: The server computes V P W = h(username Ks) ⊕ h(username P W ) and stores (username, V P W ) in its database.
Login and authentication phase
In this phase, the user communicates with the remote server through a public channel. When the user U wants the login into the remote server, he/she performs the following steps to execute a session of the protocol:
• Auth1: U → S : REQU EST username, aP U choose a random integer a ∈ (1, q), computes and sends aP in the request message REQU EST {username, aP } to S.
• Auth2: S → U : CHALLEN GE{realm, bP, σ} Upon receiving the request message, S first chooses randomly b ∈ (1, q) and computes bP , SK s = baP , and σ = h(SK s K s aP bp aP ). Then, S sends the challenge message CHALLEN GE{realm, bP, σ} back to U .
• Auth3: U → S : RESP ON SE{realm, H} Upon receiving the challenge message, U computes SK u = abP and checks if σ = h(SK u aQ s bP aP ). If so, U computes h(realm SK u h(username P W ) and sends RESP ON SE{realm, H} back to S and computes the session key SK = h(username SK u aP bP ). Otherwise, U rejects it.
• Auth4: Upon receiving the response message, S verifies if h(realm SK s {V P W ⊕ h(username K s )}) = H. If ok, U is authenticated and S computes the session key SK = h(username SK s aP bP ). Otherwise, S aborts.
Password change phase
In this phase, the user can change freely his/her password through a public channel. To do so, he/she firstly needs to execute the login and authentication phase with his/her username and old password P W . After receiving the successful authentication confirmation from the server and sharing the session key SK, the user U input the new password P W * as follows:
The user U computes P W D = h(SK username) ⊕ h(username P W * ) and V = h(SK h(username P W * )), then sends them to the server.
• Pass2: S → U : {Accept, R 1 }or{Reject, R 2 } Upon receiving the message P W D and V , the server computes H ′ 2 = P W D ⊕ h(SK username) and checks whether V is equal to h(SK||H ′ 2 ).
If so, the server accepts the password change request, then computes R 1 = h(Accept username P W D V SK) and sends {Accept, R 1 } back to user. Otherwise, the server rejects the password change request, then computes R 2 = h(Reject username P W D V SK) and sends Reject, R 2 back to user. Finally, the server replaces P W D with P W D
Cryptanalysis of Farash et al.'s protocol.
Farash et al. showed that their protocol can resist to various attacks. However, in this section, we will demonstrate that Farash et al.'s proposed protocol is still vulnerable to Denning-Sacco attack and DoS attack.
Denning-Sacco attack
The Denning-Sacco attack is when User or Server compromises an old session key and an attacker tries to find a long-term private key (e.g. user password or server private key) or other session keys. This attack arises from the fact that compromising a fresh session key SK enables the scheme to be compromised. Such attacks have been known for some time. In Farash et al.'s SIP authentication scheme exactly in password change phase the Denning-Sacco attack is possible. An attacker records Farash et al.'s SIP authentication scheme. The attacker can obtain easily P W D,V and Accept and somehow obtains the old shared session key SK between the SIP client and the server. Then, the attacker can find the long-term private password P W by performing the following offline password guessing attack.
• The attacker selects a candidate password P W ′ from the password dictionary D.
• The attacker computes V ′ = h(SK h(username P W ′ )).
• Finally attacker compares obtained V and computed V ′ . If they are equal,the attacker guesses the correct password of U . If not, the attacker repeats the above process until V = V ′ . 
The proposed algorithm:
Denial of service attack
In the password change phase, the server change user's password without asking about the old one. So, if the user has not closed her/his session and an attacker accessed to the user's application, he can change the user's password without knowing the old one. Then, if the password is changed the legitimate user can never access to the server. Figure 3 illustrates the details of this attack. 
Our proposed protocol
In this section, in order to overcome the security weaknesses of Farash et al.'s scheme, we propose a new secure SIP authentication protocol based on ECC. The proposed protocol consists of four phases: system setup, registration, login and authentication and password change.
System setup phase
In this section, the server selects an elliptic curve equation E p (a, b), over a finite field F q , an additive group G of order p and P a base point generator with order n over equation E p (a, b), n is a large prime of height entropy. Then, the server selects an integer K s ∈ (1, q) as the long-live secret key, and computes its public key Q s = K s P . Next, the server chooses three one-way hash functions h(.), h 1 (.) and h 2 (.). Finally, S saves secretly its private key K s and publishes the following parameters {E(GF q ), P, q, h(.), h 1 (.), h 2 (.), Q s }.
Registration phase
When user U want to register with the server S. U and S perform the following steps via a secured channel.
• Reg 1: U chooses freely its username and password P W , selects randomly a number a ∈ R Z * p , computes HP W = h(P W a)P . Then U sends username and HP W to S.
• Reg 2: S computes V P W = h(username K s )P ⊕ HP W . Then, S insert V P W in a smart card. Finally, S send Smart Card to U .
• Reg 3: U insert a in its Smart Card.
Login and authentication phase
This phase is illustrated in Figure 4 . If a legitimate user U want to login to remote server S, he/she inserts its Smart Card in card reader, then inputs username and password P W . After that the server and Smart Card perform the following steps.
• Auth 1: U → S : REQU EST (V, bP, I, T 1 ) User's Smart Card picks randomly a number b ∈ R Z * p , computes bP ,L = bQ s , M = b(V P W ⊕ h(P W a)P ), I = username + L, and V = h(username bP L M ). Then it sends message REQU EST (V, bP, I, T 1 ) to server, T 1 denotes the current timestamp. Upon receiving message REQUEST at time T 2 , S verifies the validity of
If it is true, U is authenticated by S. Next S selects randomly a number c ∈ R Z * p , and computes
and SKey = h 2 (Auth s c K s bP ). Finally, S sends challenge message CHALLEN GE(realm, c, Auth s , T 3 ) back to U . • Auth 4:
Upon receiving message RESPONSE at time T 6 from user U , S verifies the validity of T 6 − T 5 ≤ △T . If is not fresh, S stops the process. If is valid, S computes and verifies the validity ofAuth u
Password change phase
In this phase, if user U wants to change his password he/she must firstly execute the login and authentication phase. Then execute the following steps:
• Pass 1: U → S : (a * , Rep u ) U inserts her/his username and old P W , chooses freely his/her new password P W * , and selects randomly a * ,b ∈ R Z * p . Then computes, HP W = h(P W * a * )P , tag u = h(username b HP W ), and it uses the session key SKey to encrypt the new parameters Rep u = E SKey (username tag u b HP W ).
• Pass 2: S → U : (Rep s )
Upon receiving the information, the server decrypts the message and then checks the validity of the authentication tag u ? = h(username b HP W ). If it is valid, the server computes the new secret information V P W * = h(username K s )P ⊕ HP W and tag s = h(username b + 1 V P W * ). Then, it sends encryption information Rep s = E KSey (V P W * tag s ) back to the user U .
• Pass 3: The user U decrypts received message and verifies the validity of
If it is valid, the user U stores V P W * and a * in its smart card.
6 Security analysis
Session key secrecy
Session key security means that at the end of the key exchange anyone cannot know the session key excepting the legal communication parties (the user and the server).
In the proposed scheme the session key is computed in this way SKey = h 2 (Auth s c K s bP ) or SKey = h 2 (Auth s c bQ s ) where
Since K s and b are secret, the session key cannot be calculated by anyone except the server and the client. Therefore, our proposed protocol provides session key secrecy.
Mutual authentication
In the proposed scheme the server can authenticate the user after receiving REQUEST by checking V , and after receiving RESPONSE by checking Auth u . Upon receiving message CHALLENGE, user can authenticate the server by testing validity of Auth s . So both the user and server are authenticated to each other within the same protocol. Consequently, the proposed protocol provides mutual authentication.
Denning-Sacco attack
The Denning-Sacco attack is when User or Server compromises an old session key and an attacker tries to find a long-live private key (e.g. user password or server private key) or other session keys. In our proposed protocol, the session key is calculated in this way: SKey = h 2 (Auth s c K s bP ) or SKey = h 2 (Auth s c bQ s ), where
If an attacker obtained this key, he/she have firstly to know username which is not sent directly, then to face h() and h 2 () to guess server's secret key K s which is high entropy. In addition, the attacker cannot get user's password P W because P W is not used to compute session key.
Offline password guessing attack
Suppose that an attacker eavesdrops the communication between user U and server S, and gets V, bP, I, Auth u and Auth s , where V = h(username||bP ||L||M ) and M = b(V P W ⊕ h(P W a)P ) = h(username K s )bP , so no one of these values contains P W . Consequently, the attacker is not able to verify any password guessing.
Online password guessing attack
Suppose that an attacker attempts to find the password of a legal user by online interacting with the smart card. The attacker have to guess all possible passwords to perform the login and authentication phase. Will the smart card login verification method is delivered with a limited number of login attempts with wrong password and identity. In general, when the third attempt goes wrong, the smart card gets blocked and asks for server intervention to unblock and reactivation. Consequently, our proposed protocol is secured against online password guessing attack.
Stolen verifier attack
The stolen verifier attack means that an adversary steals the secret information from the server, like user's password. Then, the adversary uses it directly to masquerade as a legitimate user in a user authentication connection. In the proposed scheme, any user's secret is stored in server database, so the attackers cannot obtain the user's secret information from server. Therefore, our proposed protocol is secure against stolen verifier attack.
User impersonation attack
Assume that attacker wishes to connect to the server as legitimate user U . He/she has to prove its validity by forging two messages REQU EST (V, bP, I, T 1 ) and RESP ON SE(Auth u , T 5 ). However, he/she did not have any information about secret parameters as P W , username, K s , a, b and V P W . Therefore, the attacker is not capable to send the two validate messages. As result, our scheme can resist user impersonation attack.
Server spoofing attack
The proposed scheme can resist against server spoofing attack. Assume that attacker wants to impersonate the server and spoof user U , he/she has to computes Auth s = h 1 (username bP K s P c L ′ M ′ ). However, he/she does not have any information about username and server secret key K s . Then, he/she cannot compute L ′ and M ′ . Therefore, the attacker cannot forge a valid CHALLEN GE message.
Replay attack
In general, there are three ways to defend replay attacks that are, challenge-response mechanisms, timestamps and sequence numbers. In our scheme, the challenge-response and timestamps mechanisms are used to detect replay attacks. Suppose an adversary intercepts the message CHALLEN GE(realm, c, Auth s , T 3 ) and wishes to replay it to impersonate a legal server. However, since he/she does not know username and server secret key K s , he/she is not able to compute Auth s . Therefore, if he/she replays a previous message CHALLEN GE, the user can detect replay attack by checking T u − T s ≤ △T and by comparing between value of h 1 (username bP Q s c L M ) and value of received Auth s . On the other hand, if he/she intercepts the message REQU EST (V, bP, I, T 1 ) or RESP ON SE(Auth u , T 5 ) then replays it. The server can detect a replay attack by checking the condition T s − T u ≤ △T .
Privileged insider attack
It happens that a malicious server can obtain the private information related to legitimate user and use it to connect with the server. In our protocol, the user sends his/her username and password P W to the server in the registration phase. Even if the attacker knows these information, he/she does not know the value of b and value of server secret key K s . So, he/she cannot compute the value Auth s not to mention the shared session key SKey.
Performance analysis
In this section, the performance of our proposed authentication and key agreement protocol is compared with other related authentication protocols. Let T h , T pm , T pa , T inv , T EKs and T DKs denote the computational cost of one-way hash operation, the computational cost of elliptic curve point multiplication, the computational cost of elliptic curve point addition, the computational cost of modular inversion, the computational cost of symmetric encryption, the computational cost of symmetric decryption, respectively.
As illustrated in Table 1 the computational costs of the user side and the server side in our protocol's registration phase are 1T h + 1T pm and 1T h + 1T pm . The computational costs of the user side and the server side in our protocol's authentication phase are 5T h + 3T pm and 5T h + 2T pm . The computational costs of the user side and the server side in our protocol's password change phase are 3T h + 1T EKs + 1T DKs + 1T pm and 3T h + 1T EKs + 1T DKs + 1T pm . We can get that the performance of our protocol is much better than Zhang et al.'s protocol in all phases. As we can see, our protocol's authentication phase which is the important phase is faster than the same phase of Chaudhry's protocol and Kumari's protocol, because our protocol use only 5T h + 3T pm and 5T h + 2T pm in this phase, and Chaudhry's protocol computes 5T h + 3T pm + 1T pa and 3T h + 1T EKs + 1T DKs + 1T pm , and Kumari's protocol need to calculate 5T h + 3T pm + 1T pa and 5T h + 2T pm . Zhang et al. (2013) ; P2, Farash and Attari (2013) ; P3, Chaudhry et al. (2017) ; P4, Kumari et al. (2017) In Table 2 , the results of the comparison between our protocol and some proposed SIP authentication protocols are shown. As we can remark, our protocol is secure against stolen verifier attack, Denning-Sacco attack, password guessing attack, replay attack, man in the middle attack, server spoofing attack and impersonation attack. Furthermore, Chaudhry et al. and Kumari et al. have note proved that their protocols are secured against some attack such as Denning-Sacco attack, server spoofing attack and impersonation attack. As result, we can say that our protocol is more secure if it is compared with some related protocols. 
